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MEASURING LIVES UNDER THE
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTORY RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
FRANK L. JoNms t
Many words have been written about the "wait-and-see" statutes
which, where enacted, alter the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.
Too many, says Professor Leach, who thinks there should be more such
laws and no more articles.1 If his suggestion is to be heeded, it may
be hoped that other legislatures tackling the problem anew will come
up with acts of-more clarity and less doubtful validity than section 4
of the Pennsylvania Estates Act of 1947.'
This Comment will not prolong the debate concerning the desirability of wait-and-see legislation. As a matter of policy, wait-and-see
may be wise or unwise. But regardless of one's views on the policy
question, it is not the policy itself but rather the specific embodiment
of it in section 4 of the Estates Act with which Pennsylvania lawyers
and courts have to contend.
Consideration of the Pennsylvania legislation suggests that it may
not withstand an attack challenging it as unconstitutionally vague.
The act's potentially fatal flaw concerns the measuring life problem.
That there will be difficulty in determining which lives are measuring
lives is not a novel suggestion 3 -even Professor Leach impliedly
concedes that there is less than desirable clarity.' He avoids a square
t A.B. 1952, Westminster College; LL.B. 1955, Harvard University. Member,
Pennsylvania and Florida Bars.
I Leach, PerpetuitiesLegislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1124,
1154 (1960).
2
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950). The act reads as follows: "No interest
shall be void as a perpetuity except as herein provided. . . . Upon the expiration
of the period allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities as measured by
actual rather than possible events any interest not then vested and any interest in
members of a class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be
"
void .....
Mechem,
A Brief Reply to Professor Leach, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1155,
3 See
1156-57 (1960) ; Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 976, 981-82 (1959) ; Phipps, The Pennsylvania Exjperiment in Perpetuities,23 TEmP. L.Q. 20 (1949) ; Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 732 (1955); Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities
Doomed?, 52 MicH. L. REv. 179, 190 (1953).
4 Professor Leach, that most vigorous champion of the wait-and-see principle,
states that it "may take a few cases to work out" the rules for determining appropriate measuring lives under the statutory modifications of the rule. Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: England, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1411, 1415 (1957). See also
Leach, supra note 1, at 1142-47. The problem seems particularly acute under the
Pennsylvania statute.
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confrontation of the matter by asking rhetorically whether "[the antireformist writers] are . . . trying to make the statute look bad?" '

Well, it is bad-the statute, that is, not necessarily the policy behind it.
But it is not a bad statute because the "anti-reformists" have taken the
trouble to demonstrate its deficiencies.
Section 4 assumes a nonexistent correlation between two concepts:
first, "the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule
against perpetuities"; and second, the measurement thereof by "actual
events." The statute assumes that "the period allowed by the common
law rule" is an ascertainable span of time at the end of which vesting
either will or will not have occurred. In fact, the period allowed by
the common-law rule is not a period of time at all. It is a projection
of possibilities made as of the effective date of the instrument in question. In short, the basic difficulty with section 4 is that it provides no
ground rules for determining when the period allowed by the commonlaw rule does expire but nevertheless requires that the new provisions
shall operate as of that will-o'-the-wisp expiration date.
MEASURING

LIvES UNDER THE COmMON-LAW RULE

At common law an interest not necessarily vesting within twentyone years after the termination of some life in being at the effective
date of the instrument is void from the beginning. Concerned as it is
with possibilities only, the common-law rule is not difficult to apply.
For this purpose the law indulges in the presumptions, among others,
that everyone living on a given day might die the next and that every
living person is capable of having children-and goes on from there.
Thus, the validity of the remainders in the following familiar examples
is easily predictable under the common-law rule:
Example 1: T devises Blackacre "to A for life, then to A's children
for their lives with rights of survivorship, remainder in fee to A's
grandchildren living at the death of the survivor of A's children."
Example 2: T devises Blackacre "to A for life, then to A's children
for their lives with rights of survivorship, remainder in fee to A's
grandchildren living at the death of the survivor of A's children;
provided, that if the remainder in A's grandchildren does not
vest within twenty-one years following the death of the survivor
of W, X, Y, and Z, then the property revert to my heirs."
Assume in both examples that at T's death A is living, is sixty years
old, and has one adult married child, B. Assume further that W, X,
Y, and Z are four healthy infants, all of whom survive T. The re5 Leach, .upra note 1, at 1143.
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mainder in example 1 is void at common law. In example 2, however,
the probabilities are that it will vest in time, and it is certainly not
void from the beginning since it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of W, X, Y, and Z.6
Is it accurate to conclude that the lives of W, X, Y, and Z are
irrelevant, even under the common-law rule, in determining the validity
of the future interest in example 1 ? They are irrelevant if by that is
meant the probable longevity of the survivor is no help to the lawyer
seeking to uphold the future interest. On the other hand, it is clear
that there is nothing inherently irrelevant about them. Witness example 2.
Taking the analysis one step further, what about A's life itself in
example 1? Is it a "measuring life"? If the term "measuring lives"
is meant to encompass only those lives whose termination will
establish a valid outer limit within which vesting must occur, then by
definition A's life does not qualify. Or perhaps it is more accurate,
theoretically, to say that A's is a measuring life but that the remainder
is nevertheless void because it will not necessarily vest within twentyone years after A's death.
Now consider two equally clear cases:
Example 3: T devises Blackacre "to A for life, remainder to A's
eldest grandchild living at A's death."
Example 4: T devises Blackacre "to A if and when (or twenty-one
years after) A marries."
In each of these examples the future interest is good. In each, A's
is a built-in measuring life. In each, A is both beneficially interested in
the property and mentioned by name in the will. But is it the presence
of either or both of these facts that makes his a measuring life? No,
of course not. At common law the measuring life need have no relationship either to the property or to the dispositive instrument. 7 A's is a
measuring life because, in each example, the future interest will neces6 In a practical sense there was room for more than a little waiting and seeing
even under the common-law rule. For instance, in example 2, the grandchildren would
have had to wait until twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of W, X, Y,
and Z to see, first, if B's death had conveniently occurred, and second, if so, how
large their own group was at that time, the latter fact determining the size of their
shares. The following advice, therefore, may (or may not) placate a client impatient
to know his rights under an instrument governed by the Estates Act:
Remaindermen you may yet be,
The statute says to wait and see,
But don't despair: at common law
They also served who waited and saw.
7 Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1040 (1805);
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§ 374, comment j (1944).

a Nutshell, 51 HAmv. L. REv. 638, 641 (1938).

See also Leach, Perpetuities in
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sarily vest, if at all, no later than twenty-one years after his death.
Trying to be more specific is both futile and unnecessary.
The converse is also true at common law-that is, the fact that a
named person has a life estate is not enough, of itself, to qualify him
for measuring-life status. Examples 1 and 3 may be contrasted to
illustrate the point. In both instances A has a valid life estate. Only
in example 3, however, does A's life qualify as a measuring life, at
least in any meaningful way.
Though it is possible, then, to make certain positive statements
about measuring lives under the common-law rule, these propositions,
even collectively, do not jell into anything like a definition of the term.
The simple reason for the common law's failure to supply a readymade
definition for "measuring life" is that none is required in applying the
common-law rule. The usual formulation of the rule itself includes
everything that needs to be said about measuring lives. For example,
a lawyer asked for advice on any of the four hypotheticals postulated
thus far would appear something of a dolt, and rightly so, if he began
the analysis by asking: "Now, let's see, whose lives can we use as
measuring lives here?" The appropriate question, of course, would be:
"Is this interest necessarily going to vest, if ever it's going to, within
the lifetime of some person alive at the testator's death, or at least no
later than twenty-one years after such person's death ?"
Having posed the proper question for himself, the lawyer will have
no trouble answering "no" to example 1 and "yes" to examples 2,
3, and 4. He will not speculate as to whether A's is properly regarded
as a measuring life in example 1 because it doesn't make a nickel's
worth of difference. The remainder is void for remoteness regardless
of the answer to the theoretical question.
Section 4 of the Estates Act, however, destroys the possibilities
test of the common law and plunks the law of the commonwealth down,
more or less blindfolded, smack in the middle of the conceptual jungle
inherently growing out of any attempt to define "measuring life"-a
term which, standing alone, was devoid of meaning at common law.
The act requires that the period allowed by the common-law rule be
determined prior to and independently of application of the rule. A
two-stage process is thus substituted for the single inquiry posed by the
common law. Whether the period has expired must always be
determined in isolation. And this necessarily entails clothing the term
"measuring life" with independent meaning, a process about as straightforward as the definition of "good" for one not acquainted with the
concept of "evil." The draftsmen seem to have missed the yang and
yin of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.
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4 OF THE ESTATES ACT

In hacking out a solution to the measuring lives problem under
section 4-if they are able to do so at all-the courts will have three
approaches from which to choose: first, the "strict approach," that is,
the measuring lives can be limited to those so regarded at common law;
second, the "universal approach," that is, the lives of all human beings
living at the effective date of the instrument may be consulted; or third,
the "selective approach," that is, an arbitrary set of rules can be
fashioned on a case-by-case basis for this or that type of situation.
While none of these approaches seems satisfactory, speculation luckily
need not be entirely in the dark.
For more than a decade Pennsylvania's statutory substitute for
the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities did not affect the outcome
of a single reported case.8 Then the Court of Common Pleas for
Dauphin County decided Mumma v. Hinkle.' Whatever else may be
said of the decision, it does afford Pennsylvania lawyers an opportunity
to examine section 4 in the aftermath of its first encounter with a set
of facts.
Although this Comment is not an indictment of the wait-and-see
principle, to the extent that such an indictment has been brought,
Pennsylvania's legislation may be considered the prosecution's bill of
particulars and Mumma v. Hinkle its first witness. What happened
to bring about the litigation was substantially this: in 1950 the defendant, by written instrument, gave the plaintiff an option to purchase
a certain tract of land for thirty thousand dollars. The contract bound
the defendant's "heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns" and
ran in favor of the plaintiff, her "heirs, executors, administrators, and
assigns." There was no stated time limit within which the option had
to be exercised. In 1956 the plaintiff purported to exercise the option,
tendering thirty thousand dollars. Defendant refused to convey and
plaintiff sued to compel specific performance. Defendant demurred.
At common law the option was plainly worthless-void as a perpetuity at least since Barton v. Thaw."0 The court, however, decided in
favor of the plaintiff, overruling the demurrer. The decision was based
8
The statutory provisions exempting certain types of interests from any rule
against perpetuities, statutory or otherwise, have affected the outcome of several cases.
In particular, the cemetery lot exemption has been called upon fairly often. See Dreisbach's Estate, 26 Leh. L.J. 459 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1955); Duffy's Estate, 2 Pa.
D. & C.2d 250 (Orphans' Ct. 1954); Reedy's Estate, 40 Berks Co. L.J. 81 (Pa.
Orphans' Ct. 1947). These cases are, however, outside the mainstream of the law
and can have no effect on the development of the act's basic provision.
9 71 Dauph. Co. Rep. 241 (Pa. C.P. 1958). For a comment on the effect of the
decision on option agreements, see 4 VILL. L. Rav. 144 (1958).
10 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914).
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on the Estates Act and the following is the crux of the opinion: "We
think that under the plain provisions of § 4 where a future interest
created by a contract vests within the lives of the contracting parties,
the future interest cannot be declared void as a perpetuity." 11
The future interest in Mumma v. Hinkle was created less than six
years before it "vested." That is not very long. But the court did not
advert to this relatively brief period in reaching its conclusion. Instead, it noted that both parties to the contract were still alive when
the option was exercised. It is the ease with which the court treated the
lives of the contracting parties as proper measuring lives that compels
one's attention.
If the opinion is good law, two corollaries follow. First, the
outcome would be the same if only one contracting party were alive at
the time of vesting. Under the common-law rule any life in being will
do. Second, the option would remain exercisable until at least twentyone years after the death of the survivor of both contracting parties.
If theirs are proper measuring lives, the courts, required as they are to
wait until the expiration of the period allowed by the common-law rule,
cannot become impatient and quit their vigil at the conclusion of the
measuring lives. That would be a different, and briefer, period than
that allowed at common law-which, after all, is the waiting period
specified in section 4.
It is clear that the court regarded the lives of Miss Mumma and
Mr. Iinkle, at least, as proper measuring lives. The crucial question
is why they were so regarded. Was it because they happened to be
parties to the agreement? (The selective approach.) Or was it because their own continued existences, quite apart from their participation in the contract, offered convenient and conclusive proof that some
"life in being" at the effective date of the agreement remained in
existence when the interest vested? (The universal approach.) Or was
the interest really upheld, despite the court's language to the contrary,
because it vested within twenty-one years? (The strict approach.)
The result in Mumma v. Hinkle is consistent with any of the three
approaches and the language of the opinion with two of them.
The Universal Approach
The universal approach has the advantage of being closer than
either of the others to an "actual events" measurement of "the period
allowed by the common law rule." Waiting until twenty-one years after
the death of the survivor of all persons living at the effective date of
1171 Dauph. Co. Rep. at 245.
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the instrument is, after all, waiting no longer than the period allowable
at common law. If that survivor turns out to be a shepherd living in
the hills of Afghanistan, no matter. The testator could have specified
that shepherd's life as the measuring life even at common law. Now
the testator merely has the statutory test to do the specifying for him
in the light of hindsight or, as the draftsmen preferred, in the light of
"actual events." Unhappily, the universal approach is completely unworkable, the Afghan Bureau of Vital Statistics being what it probably
is.
The Selective Approach
While the selective approach will not entail extended treks to the
Middle East, it will involve a long process of picking and choosing
appropriate measuring lives for the infinite variety of fact situations
which can and will arise. Returning to Mumma v. Hinkle, recall the
court's assumption that some measuring life was available."2 The
court did consider the lives of the parties to the agreement as measuring
lives, but they would have had no such special significance at common
law. The agreement also bound their "heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns." Suppose, therefore, instead of the actual facts in Mumma
v. Hinkle, that the original parties died immediately after executing the
agreement. Suppose further that the optionee's executor, the next day,
purported to exercise the option by a letter to the optionor's executor.
Suppose still further that both executors were individuals who had been
living at the effective date. Would the option not be upheld under
these facts also? Probably it would. It is true that using the executors'
12 It is curious that Professor Leach suggests that in cases like Mumma v. Hinkle
the gross period of twenty-one years should be the waiting period because there are
no "relevant lives." Leach, supra note 1, at 1145. One can only wonder why the
optionor's and optionee's lives are less relevant than those lives designated as being

relevant by Professor Leach in his hypothetical judicial opinion appearing a page
earlier. The distinction would make sense under the Massachusetts act where
holders of valid life estates are used as the measuring lives and there is no attempt to
utilize the common-law time period. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 184A, §§ 1-6 (1955).
It seems pretty clear that under the Pennsylvania act the line between what are
relevant lives and what are "patently frivolous" or irrelevant lives is an arbitrary one.
Furthermore, it is a line that can never rise above the arbitrary so long as the courts
are bound, as they are in Pennsylvania, to draw it with an eye on an apparently
mandatory but nondirective statutory test. The problem of drawing the line under
the selective approach is illustrated by two different assumptions made in regard to
the application of the act to the following facts: T devises Blackacre to his son, A,
for life, remainder in equal shares to A's children, if any, for their lives with survivorship, and, on the death of the survivor, to T's eldest male lineal descendant
then living, in fee simple. T is survived by his wife, W, his three-yar-old son, A,
and a daughter, Mary. One commentator has assumed that A's is the only measuring
life, Br~gy, A Defense of Pennsylvanids Statute on Perpetuities,23 TEMP. L.Q. 313,
316 (1950), while another has assumed that Mary's life would also be available on
the theory that she was also named in the will, Phipps, supra note 3, at 23. Who is
right is not the point. The point is that the statute as enacted leaves the matter completely up in the air.
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lives as measuring lives is one step removed from using those of the
original parties. The latter were named in the agreement and the
former, necessarily, only described. But that can scarcely matter unless
an arbitrary judge-made rule makes it matter under the process of
''selectivity."
Option agreements are admittedly odd cases. A more orthodox
perpetuities question provides a fairer test. Assume the following fact
situation:
Example 5: T, a bachelor, in a valid will, devises Blackacre (part
of the residue) "to S,the son of my best friend, for life, remainder
to S's children living at S's death for their lives with rights of
survivorship, then to the grandchildren of S living at the death of
the survivor of S's children in fee simple." At T's death, S is
living, married, and without children. One year later, however, a
son, G, is born to S. S dies on the day his son is born. Twentyone years later, G marries and has a son, H. G dies on the day his
son is born. It is now twenty-two years after T's death and
twenty-one-plus years after S's death. A lawsuit follows between
H's guardian and B, an errant brother of T and T's only heir at
law. B is sixty years old.
The weakness of B's case under the "actual events" test is obvious.
He must argue that H's interest did not vest within twenty-one years
of some life in being at T's death, when his own ability to appear in
court and make the argument gives it the lie. That the court would
be motivated by T's obvious intent to exclude his brother and by the
relatively short period of twenty-two years which had elapsed since T's
death is to be expected. Furthermore, the act allows-perhaps even
requires-an award of Blackacre to H. If "actual events" is the test,
H's interest did vest within twenty-one years of some life in being at
T's death-namely, B's life. Would it be unworkable to extend the
measuring life concept under the act to allow consideration of the lives
of the disputing claimants? No, it would not.
Nor is there any reason to stop the search for a life in being with
those of the disputing claimants. Suppose, in example 5, that B was
not T's sixty year old brother but rather T's twenty year old nephew
who had already squandered three fortunes. Now B's is not a life in
being at T's death. But what is to prevent the judge, I, from reasoning: "I, J,am sixty years old. Mine was a life in being at T's death.
In fact, T was a friend of mine. Judgment for H." Professor Leach
regards the possibility of such a holding as "patently frivolous" and
points to two sources "neglected" by Professor Mechem and others
"which indicate that no such nonsense as they propose was intended by
the official committee . . . which prepared this statute-and there-
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fore, on recognized principles of statutory construction, that no such
intention can be attributed to the legislature .... ,,13 One of the
sources is the commissioners' comment that the act "is intended to
disturb the common law rule as little as possible, but to make actualities
at the end of the period, rather than possibilities as of the creation of
But, as Professor Mechem points out,
the interest, govern . . . . "
only an "external resemblance" to
bears
wisdom,
its
whatever
the act,
the common-law rule; '" Professor Simes has branded it "revolutionary." 1 There may be those who take comfort in the comment of the
commissioners. Were it not for its source I would be inclined to think
it naive, let alone the sort of stuff from which legislative intent should
be derived.
The Strict Approach
The adoption of the strict approach, which would restrict measuring lives under the act to those which would be so regarded at common
law, is not likely for several reasons. In the first place, although such
a rule sounds easy enough, no one knows what it means. The discussion of example 1 indicates that it is not even clear that the holder of
a valid life estate preceding a void future interest is a measuring life
at common law. In the second place, the court in Mumma v. Hinkle
plainly rejected any such limitation when it assumed there was necessarily some measuring life available in a case where at common law
there would have been none. Finally, and most important, there will be
cases in which the "fair" result requires resort to measuring lives which
clearly would not be so regarded at common law. A further example
may clarify the point:
Example 6: T devises Blackacre "to A for life, then to A's widow
for life, remainder in-fee to B's issue living at the death of A's
widow." At T's death A is married to W. A dies and leaves W
as his widow. Twenty-two years later W dies. W was, in fact,
alive at T's death.
Assuming that the term "widow" in the will cannot be construed to
mean W, the remainder to B's issue would be void at common law
under the familiar "unborn widow" application of the rule: " the courts
would assume that W might die or divorce A, who might then marry
13 Leach, supra note 1, at

1144.

14 Commissioner's Comment on Section 301.4(b), in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, at 475

(1950).
15 Mechem, A Brief Reply to Professor Leach, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1155, 1157

(1960).
16 Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 179, 183
(1953).
17 Leach, supra note 7, at 644.
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W 2 who just might turn out to be someone who was not alive at T's
death. The situation represents one of the more embarrassing applications of the common-law rule, and section 4 of the Estates Act was
surely intended to correct it.
It is a safe prediction that a Pennsylvania court, with the help of
the statute, would uphold the gift to B's issue in the example. The
opinion could be expected to read something like this: "W was alive at
T's death. Furthermore, W in fact remained married to A until A
died, and in fact became his widow. Under the 'actual events' test, the
remainder vested in B's issue at W's death and since W was a life in
being the vesting occurred in time."
Convincing? Well, yes. But it cannot be overlooked that reaching
the desired result requires the court to look to a measuring life which
would not have been considered at common law-namely, W's life.
If the act requires an extension of the common law's measuring life
concept to rectify one of the plainest anomalies of the common law, it
seems reasonably clear that the act must have intended such an extension. Otherwise there was not much point in enacting the statute
at all.
Or suppose that, in Mumma v. Hinkle, Miss Mumma had exercised her option not six but twenty-two years after the agreement was
signed but while Mr. Hinkle was still alive. No court would be inclined
to strike down the option even though the gross period had fully
elapsed. Furthermore, the General Assembly probably intended that
it should be upheld and the Dauphin County Court, for one, indicated
that it would uphold the option.' But, if no measuring lives except
those so regarded at common law can be utilized, the option would
necessarily be void in such a case.
Obviously some extension of the common-law concept is needed
if section 4 is to operate as intended. The strict approach, assuming
that it could be made understandable, just will not do.
CONcLUSION

A well-developed rule of law requires that a statute which is either
too vague or internally inconsistent in some substantial respect be
declared inoperative."9 And the statutory admonition to ascertain "the
18 See 71 Dauph. Co. Rep. at 245.
19
Wilcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947) ; Miller v.
Belmont Packing & Rubber Co., 268 Pa. 51, 110 At. 802 (1920). To what particular
constitutional provision this rule of law is traceable is unclear-neither Wilcox nor
Belmont Packing discusses the question in constitutional terms. In Pennsylvania State
Athletic Comm'n v. Loughran, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 427 (C.P. 1956), however, the rule
was characterized as within the concept of due process. For present purposes, its
origin is unimportant.
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expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule against
perpetuities" by "actual rather than possible events" may be not only
too vague for intelligent application but also self-contradictory. This
statutory phrase-upon some construction of which any workable application of section 4 must depend-begins with the implicit but
fallacious assumption that there is such a thing as an "expiration" date
under the common-law rule. Contrary to this assumption, the commonlaw "period" is curiously projectible, in its relevant legal sense, only
from its beginning. The statutory requirement of an "actual events"
test to measure a period of time purportedly determinable by reference
to a common-law formula that has never before been called upon to
pinpoint an expiration date for anything is something like attempting
to measure time or distance in pounds and ounces.
The problem seems more fundamental than a "technical weakness" 20 and far worse than the mere probability of an anomalous
result.21 A technical weakness, whatever that may mean, sounds like
something curable by strong construction, and anomalous results abound
under perfectly valid statutes. The task of the courts under the act,
on the other hand, is that of converting a meaningless combination of
concepts into a meaningful body of law.
If section 4 of the Estates Act is construed to incorporate some
form of the selective approach to the measuring life problem-as is
probably the case-it should say so. Its failure to say so not only
provokes speculation about the statute's meaning but also raises the
more serious question of whether the statute conveys any meaning at
all other than a general disenchantment with the common-law rule.
Clearer language is possible, as is demonstrated by the Kentucky
act 2 which does not pretend that common-law tests are appropriate
and acknowledges that there are to be new rules-however difficult their
formulation may be-to determine the validity of future interests. The
Pennsylvania act, by assigning an impossible task to inappropriate tests,
invites criticism not limited to considerations of policy.
The Massachusetts act 2 avoids the constitutional problem entirely

by requiring that future interests vest no later than the conclusion of
preceding life estates. Here, too, there is no pretense that vesting must
occur within the time period allowed under the common-law rule. A
new test is provided.
20 See Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN.
L. REv. 41, 42-43, 64 (1957).
21 Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107

U. PA.
L. REv. 965, 976-77 (1959).
2
2Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 381.215-.223 (1960).
2 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 184A, §§ 1-6 (1955).
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If there is to be an extension of the common-law measuring life
concept for purposes of applying the statute, the courts must adopt
either the universal approach, which is "patently frivolous," or the
selective approach, which might become workable but only after subjecting practitioners and courts to years of sheer agony while they
guess at the manner in which measuring lives will be determined for
the myriad of limitations imaginable. This guesswork would be particularly distressing in a field of law whose value lies largely in its predictability. Furthermore, the selective process would be superimposed
upon statutory language which expressly incorporates the common-law
time "period" and therefore presumably prohibits either increasing or
decreasing the common-law class of "measuring lives"-that is, the
end result of such a series of judge-made rules would not be the measuring of the period allowed by the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities
which, after all, is what section 4 purports to require.
It may not be inappropriate to observe that a judicial holding of
invalidity here could prove as much a blessing as was the holding in
Wilcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.2" with regard to the Community
Property Act.2 5 It would allow the General Assembly to try again on
a clean slate-either by a new formulation of the wait-and-see principle
or by the perhaps preferable approach of specific legislation designed to
eliminate on a piecemeal basis the obvious anomalies of the common-law
rule. But until the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has an opportunity
squarely to decide the question, Pennsylvania practitioners, and particularly those concerned with estate planning, would do well to adhere
to the requirements of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. It
may be back.
24 357
25

Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947).
Pa. Laws 1947, No. 550.

